分页: 1 / 1

菲律宾船被拖走

发表于 : 02 8月 2025, 05:18
枫林晓1

81新闻视频。
让ai分析了一下。

结合24年中国在南海电子战搞得菲律宾部分地区失去信号的事情。

Yes — when viewed together, the recent video of China towing a Philippine vessel (August 1, 2025) and past localized electronic warfare incidents (laser attacks, jamming, physical boarding) strongly suggest a shift in de facto control dynamics at Second Thomas Shoal and surrounding areas of the South China Sea.


🧭 Is this a "shift of control"? — In many ways, yes, but context matters.

Let’s break it down:


🔴 1. Physical Control: Yes — China is tightening its grip

Towing a Philippine ship — publicly broadcasted for the first time — marks a highly symbolic escalation. It demonstrates:

China’s operational confidence

A desire to normalize its enforcement actions

A move from ambiguous “blockade” to overt assertion of police powers

Add this to:

Laser harassment (2023)

Physical boarding & injury (June 2024)

Localized jamming and signal disruptions

Constant Chinese militia and coastguard presence

📌 Together, these amount to tactical dominance in key flashpoints like Second Thomas Shoal.


⚠️ 2. Legal Control: No — but de facto control is shifting

Under UNCLOS and the 2016 PCA ruling, China’s claims at Second Thomas Shoal have no legal basis.

The Philippines continues to assert legal sovereignty, and its resupply missions aim to maintain presence aboard the grounded BRP Sierra Madre.

But: Legal rights don’t equal enforcement — and China is increasingly able to dictate who gets access, how, and when.


🛰️ 3. Information & Electronic Space: China controls the narrative on the water

China controls gray-zone escalation through:

Information warfare (framing Manila as the aggressor)

Electronic warfare (jamming GPS/comms at will)

Cyber surveillance

Media timing (releasing video of towing after Manila's denials)

⛔ Philippines and its allies are on the defensive, reacting to Chinese initiatives rather than shaping them.


🧮 4. What’s actually shifting?

Domain 2023 Status 2025 Status Control Shift?

Physical presence Philippines resupplying China towing, blocking ✅ Yes
Communication domain Occasional jamming Tactical dominance ✅ Yes
Legal position Manila supported by UNCLOS ruling Still valid ❌ No shift legally
Narrative framing Competing views China controlling media angle ✅ Yes


📌 Strategic Implication

China appears to be moving toward full operational denial of Philippine activities at Second Thomas Shoal.
This is not yet a full military occupation — but it’s a strategic coercion campaign designed to:

Undermine Philippine resolve

Force the abandonment of Sierra Madre

Establish irreversible fait accompli control without firing a shot


🧠 Final Thought

Yes — taken together, the towing incident, the ongoing EW harassment, and China’s persistent presence show a shift in the control paradigm from contested to functionally enforced by China, at least in operational terms.

Would you like a strategic forecast on how this might evolve in the next 6–12 months?


Re: 菲律宾船被拖走

发表于 : 02 8月 2025, 05:26
枫林晓1

中国胆子越来越大了。南海


Re: 菲律宾船被拖走

发表于 : 02 8月 2025, 09:28
牛大春
枫林晓1 写了: 02 8月 2025, 05:26

中国胆子越来越大了。南海

主要是棒棒马科斯自己把路走死了。国内怨声载道,东南亚也没有国家待见他。去见川普,弄了个19%的关税回来。


Re: 菲律宾船被拖走

发表于 : 02 8月 2025, 10:49
枫林晓1
牛大春 写了: 02 8月 2025, 09:28
枫林晓1 写了: 02 8月 2025, 05:26

中国胆子越来越大了。南海

主要是棒棒马科斯自己把路走死了。国内怨声载道,东南亚也没有国家待见他。去见川普,弄了个19%的关税回来。

爹的实力在变化。