德州的法官是选出来的

[resso]

就是这个傻叉样

[lostsoul]

就是这个傻叉样

哈哈，没想到是真的，法官也能通过选举产生。外科医生，老师，还有什么不能选举产生的？

https://ballotpedia.org/Rob_Kelly

Kelly ran for election to the Kerr County Court at Law.
Primary: He was defeated in the Republican primary on March 4, 2014, receiving 15.3 percent of the vote.

https://ballotpedia.org/Robert_Kelly_(K ... date_2022)
Robert Kelly (Republican Party) ran for re-election for judge of the Kerr County Court in Texas. Kelly was on the ballot in the general election on November 8, 2022.

八年磨一剑啊，从 2014 年 15.3% 的得票率，到 2022 成功当选法官，提高太快了。

[lostsoul]

就是这个傻叉样

又查了一下，好像还不是少数：
https://ballotpedia.org/Partisan_election_of_judges

Partisan Election	Nonpartisan Election	Gubernatorial Appointment	Legislative Election	Michigan Method	Assisted Appointment
Alabama	Arkansas	California	South Carolina	Michigan	Alaska
Illinois	Georgia	Maine	Virginia		Arizona
Louisiana	Idaho	Massachusetts			Colorado
New Mexico	Kentucky	New Hampshire			Connecticut
North Carolina	Minnesota	New Jersey			Delaware
Ohio	Mississippi				District of Columbia
Pennsylvania	Montana				Florida
Texas (two courts)	Nevada				Hawaii
	North Dakota				Indiana
	Oregon				Iowa
	Washington				Kansas
	West Virginia				Maryland
	Wisconsin				Missouri
					Nebraska
					New York
					Oklahoma (two courts)
					Rhode Island
					South Dakota
					Tennessee
					Utah
					Vermont
					Wyoming
Total: 8 states	Total: 13 states	Total: 5 states	Total: 2 states	Total: 1 state	Total: 21 states & D.C.

[lostsoul]

Arguments in support of partisan elections

In a paper published for the University of Chicago Law School in 2010 titled "Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather Than Appointed Judiciary," the authors wrote:

“Using a dataset of state high court opinions, we construct objective measures for three aspects of judicial performance: effort, skill and independence. The measures permit a test of the relationship between performance and the four primary methods of state high court judge selection: partisan election, non-partisan election, merit plan, and appointment. The empirical results do not show appointed judges performing at a higher level than their elected counterparts. Appointed judges write higher quality opinions than elected judges do, but elected judges write many more opinions, and the evidence suggests that the large quantity difference makes up for the small quality difference. In addition, elected judges do not appear less independent than appointed judges. The results suggest that elected judges are more focused on providing service to the voters (that is, they behave like politicians), whereas appointed judges are more focused on their long-term legacy as creators of precedent (that is, they behave like professionals).”

In a paper published in the Quarterly Journal of Political Science in 2007 titled "The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior," the authors wrote:

“Broadly speaking, there are two mechanisms by which elections might produce faithful representation on the part of elected officials. The first is selection. Ideally, competitive elections allow voters to choose candidates whose preferences most closely mirror their own (Downs 1957, Fearon 1999). In the selection account, the presence of challengers facilitates a closer match between voters and their representatives through the provision of alternatives. The second mechanism is the incentive effect of elections (Barro 1973, Ferejohn 1986). Even those incumbents who do not share their constituents’ preferences or possess strong qualifications may nonetheless behave faithfully or work hard if their failure to do so will result in their subsequent punishment at the polls.”

Arguments in opposition to partisan elections
In a white paper released in January 2003 by The Federalist Society titled The Case for Judicial Appointments, the authors wrote:

“The partisan election process, then, is not only demeaning to judges and casts doubt over their impartiality, but the empirical evidence shows that the selection process often becomes captive to the interests of plaintiffs’ lawyers in the trial bar. Plaintiffs’ lawyers generally are disproportionately high financial contributors to election campaigns, and the defense bar does not have adequate incentives to join the battle. . . . In addition, in states with partisan judicial elections it is more likely that higher judgments will be recovered by plaintiffs bringing suit against out-of-state corporations, particularly where the poverty level of the state is high, and there is great income inequality in the state. ”

In a paper published in 2006 by the Brennan Center for Justice titled Rethinking Judicial Selection in State Courts, author Alicia Bannon wrote:

“At the same time judicial election spending has grown, judicial races have also become increasingly political and partisan. Justice requires that judges put aside their political preferences and loyalties when deciding cases, and rule based on their understanding of the law and the facts at issue. But when judges look no different than other politicians during the election season, it creates the appearance — and perhaps also the reality — that they will not be able to avoid political biases when they sit in the courtroom.”